

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security CommitteeOS REGISTRY
FILE CMC-5-5

SECOM-D-116

23 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chairman

SUBJECT: Subcommittee Chairmanships

1. At the April SECOM meeting we discussed the Physical Security Working Group (PSWG). I reported that CIA was willing to nominate an experienced senior officer to serve as Chairman of that Working Group. Now they find it impossible to do so.

2. Also, effective in August [REDACTED] Chairman, Personnel Security Subcommittee (PerSecSub) from NSA, must be replaced. He has been awarded a graduate fellowship for the next year and will not be able to continue serving with the Subcommittee.

3. We scheduled our first Physical Security Seminar [REDACTED] for 8-12 August and the next Adjudicators' Seminar for 15-19 August. Accordingly, we have an urgent need for a Chairman now to work with the established PSWG on the first Seminar. Of course, this office will provide all possible assistance. I believe that it would be advantageous also to select a replacement for [REDACTED] in time to permit him to observe the August Adjudicators' Seminar as preparation for his new responsibilities.

4. Your earliest consideration of these needs will be appreciated. Nominations for the PSWG position should be to me by 3 June, and nominations for the PerSecSub position should be in by 15 July.

[REDACTED]

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OS 3-13211

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1. Increasing concern at senior levels about the frequency and severity of unauthorized disclosures, and the provisions of NSDD-84, show the need for the Intelligence Community to reflect in its security policies the personal consequences of unauthorized disclosures damaging to the National Security. One step that can be taken immediately is for SECOM to modify DCID 1/14 standards to specify the consequences to one's SCI access eligibility of specific, unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Accordingly, it is recommended that a new paragraph 21 be added to the draft revision of DCID 1/14, to read:

"21. Security Violations. Individuals determined to have disclosed specific classified information to any person not holding a valid security clearance from a United States Government Department of Agency, or not otherwise officially authorized access to classified information, should be considered ineligible for SCI access. If such individuals hold SCI access, they should be immediately debriefed and their access should be terminated for cause. The termination shall be made a matter of record in the Community-wide, Computer-assisted, Compartmentation Control System."

Additionally, it is recommended that a new sentence be added to the end of the last section of Annex A to the draft revision of DCID 1/14 to read:

"Individuals responsible for disclosing specific classified information to any person not holding a valid security clearance from a United States Government Department or Agency, or not otherwise officially authorized access to classified information, are ineligible for initial or continued SCI access."

2. Numerous public references to cheating by college students shows the need for investigations to capture data useful for assessing intellectual honesty. An effective method of doing so would be to obtain academic records on grade point averages and results of achievement/aptitude tests. Accordingly, SECOM should consider modifying paragraph 11.g of the draft revision of DCID 1/14 to read:

"Verify graduation or attendance, and obtain the individual's recorded grade point average and results of scholastic aptitude or other tests designed to determine scholastic ability/achievement, at all institutions of higher learning within the past fifteen (15) years. If the individual did not attend an institution of higher learning, verify graduation or attendance at last secondary school within the past ten (10) years."

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